It is in many ways remarkable that ten years after his death and twenty years after the triumph of the

revolution that he led no serious, comprehensive biography of Imam Ruhullah Musavi Khomeini

has yet been written, whether in Persian or any other language. He was, after all, the pre-eminent

figure of recent Islamic history, for his impact, considerable enough in Iran itself, has also

reverberated throughout much of the Muslim world and helped to transform the worldview and

consciousness of many Muslims. Indeed, it may be precisely this magnitude of the Imam's

achievement, together with the complexity of his spiritual, intellectual and political personality, that

has so far discouraged potential biographers. The materials available for the task are, however, as

abundant as his accomplishments were varied, and the present writer hopes to take up the challenge

in the near future (Given the preliminary nature of this essay, it is not extensively footnoted. For a

complete list of the Imam's works, which furnish the primary material for his biography, as well as

select secondary sources, see the bibliography at the end of the article). What follows is therefore

nothing more than a preliminary sketch, intended to acquaint the reader with the outlines of the

Imam's life and the main aspects of his persona as an Islamic leader of exceptional stature.

Ruhullah Musavi Khomeini was born on 20 Jamadi al-Akhir 1320/ 24 September 1902, the

anniversary of the birth of Hazrat Fatima, in the small town of Khumayn, some 160 kilometres to

the southwest of Qum. He was the child of a family with a long tradition of religious scholarship.

His ancestors, descendants of Imam Musa al-Kazim, the seventh Imam of the Ahl al-Bayt, had

migrated towards the end of the eighteenth century from their original home in Nishapur to the

Lucknow region of northern India. There they settled in the small town of Kintur and began

devoting themselves to the religious instruction and guidance of the region's predominantly Shi'i

population. The most celebrated member of the family was Mir Hamid Husayn (d. 1880), author of

'Abaqat al-Anwar fi Imamat al-A'immat al-Athar, a voluminous work on the topics traditionally

Imam Khomeini's grandfather, Sayyid Ahmad, a contemporary of Mir Hamid Husayn, left Lucknow

some time in the middle of the nineteenth century on pilgrimage to the tomb of Hazrat 'Ali in Najaf.

Najaf, Sayyid Ahmad made the acquaintance of a certain Yusuf Khan, a prominent citizen of

Khumayn. Accepting his invitation, he decided to settle in Khumayn to assume responsibility for the

religious needs of its citizens and also took Yusuf Khan's daughter in marriage. Although Sayyid

Ahmad's links with India were cut by this decision, he continued to be known to his contemporaries

as "Hindi," an appellation which was inherited by his descendants; we see even that Imam Khomeini

Shortly before the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in February 1978, the Shah's regime

attempted to use this Indian element in the Imam's family background to depict him as an alien and

traitorous element in Iranian society, an attempt that as will be seen backfired on its author.

By the time of his death, the date of which is unknown, Sayyid Ahmad had fathered two children: a

daughter by the name of Sahiba, and Sayyid Mustafa Hindi, born in 1885, the father of Imam

Khomeini.

Sayyid Mustafa began his religious education in Isfahan with Mir Muhammad Taqi Mudarrisi before

continuing his studies in Najaf and Samarra under the guidance of Mirza Hasan Shirazi (d.1894), the

principal authority of the age in Shi'i jurisprudence. This corresponded to a pattern of preliminary

study in Iran followed by advanced study in the 'atabat, the shrine cities of Iraq, which for long

remained normative; Imam Khomeini was in fact the first religious leader of prominence whose

formation took place entirely in Iran.

In Dhu 'l-Hijja 1320/ March 1903, some five months after the Imam's birth, Sayyid Mustafa was

attacked and killed while travelling on the road between Khumayn and the neighboring city of Arak.

The identity of the assassin immediately became known; it was Ja'far-quli Khan, the cousin of a

certain Bahram Khan, one of the richest landowners of the region. The cause of the assassination is,

however, difficult to establish with certainty. According to an account that became standard after the

triumph of the Islamic Revolution, Sayyid Mustafa had aroused the anger of the local landowners

because of his defence of the impoverished peasantry.

However, Sayyid Mustafa himself, in addition to the religious functions he fulfilled, was also a

farmer of moderate prosperity, and it is possible that he fell victim to one of the disputes over

irrigation rights that were common at the time. A third explanation is that Sayyid Mustafa, in his

capacity of shar'ia judge of Khumayn, had punished someone for a public violation of the fast of

Sahiba, Sayyid Mustafa's sister, to have the killer punished in Khumayn proved fruitless, so his

widow, Hajar, went to Tehran to appeal for justice, according to one account carrying the infant

Ruhullah in her arms. She was followed there by her two elder sons, Murtaza and Nur al-Din, and

finally, in Rabi' al-Awwal 1323/ May 1925, Ja'far-quli Khan was publicly executed in Tehran on the

orders of 'Ayn al-Dawla, the prime minister of the day.

In 1918, the Imam lost both his aunt, Sahiba, who had played a great role in his early upbringing,

and his mother, Hajar. Responsibility for the family then devolved on the eldest brother, Sayyid

Murtaza (later to be known as Ayatullah Pasandida). The material welfare of the brothers seems to

have been ensured by their father's estate, but the insecurity and lawlessness that had cost him his

life continued. In addition to the incessant feuds among landowners, Khumayn was plagued by the

raids mounted on the town by the Bakhtiyari and Lur tribesmen whenever they had the chance.

Once when a Bakhtiyari chieftain by the name of Rajab 'Ali came raiding, the young Imam was

obliged to take up a rifle together with his brothers and defend the family home. When recounting

youth and that remained in his memory to help shape his later political activity mention may also be

made of the arbitrary and oppressive deeds of landowners and provincial governors. Thus he

recalled in later years how a newly arrived governor had arrested and bastinadoed the chief of the

Imam Khomeini began his education by memorizing the Qur'an at a maktab operated near his home

by a certain Mulla Abu 'l-Qasim; he became a hafiz by the age of seven. He next embarked on the

study of Arabic with Shaykh Ja'far, one of his mother's cousins, and took lessons on other subjects

first from Mirza Mahmud Iftikhar al-'Ulama' and then from his maternal uncle, Haji Mirza

Muhammad Mahdi. His first teacher in logic was Mirza Riza Najafi, his brother-in-law. Finally,

among his instructors in Khumayn mention may be made of the Imam's elder brother, Murtaza,

who taught him Najm al-Din Katib Qazvini's al-Mutawwal on badi' and ma'ani and one of the

treatises of al-Suyuti on grammar and syntax. (Although Sayyid Murtaza - who took the surname

Pasandida after the law mandating the choice of a surname in 1928 - studied for a while in Isfahan,

he never completed the higher levels of religious education; after working for a while in the

registrar's office in Khumayn, he moved to Qum where he was to spend the rest of his life).

In 1339/1920-21, Sayyid Murtaza sent the Imam to the city of Arak (or Sultanabad, as it was then

known) in order for him to benefit from the more ample educational resources available there. Arak

had become an important center of religious learning because of the presence of Ayatullah 'Abd al-

Karim Ha'iri (d.1936), one of the principal scholars of the day. He had arrived there in 1332/1914 at

the invitation of the townspeople, and some three hundred students - a relatively large number -

attended his lectures at the Mirza Yusuf Khan madrasa. It is probable that Imam Khomeini was not

yet advanced enough to study directly under Ha'iri; instead, he worked on logic with Shaykh

Muhammad Gulpayagani, read the Sharh al-Lum'a of Shaykh Zayn al-Din al-'Amili (d. 996/1558),

one of the principal texts of Ja'fari jurisprudence, with Aqa-yi 'Abbas Araki, and continued his study

of al-Mutawwal with Shaykh Muhammad 'Ali Burujirdi. Roughly a year after the Imam's arrival in

Arak, Ha'iri accepted a summons from the 'ulama' of Qum to join them and preside over their

activity. One of the earliest strongholds of Shi'ism in Iran, Qum had traditionally been a major

center of religious learning as well as pilgrimage to the shrine of Hazrat-I Ma'suma, a daughter of

Imam Musa al-Kazim, but it had been overshadowed for many decades by the shrine cities of Iraq

with their superior resources of erudition.

The arrival of Ha'iri in Qum not only brought about a revival of its madrasas but also began a

process whereby the city became in effect the spiritual capital of Iran, a process that was completed

by the political struggle launched there by Imam Khomeini some forty years later. The Imam

followed Ha'iri to Qum after an interval of roughly four months. This move was the first important

turning point in his life. It was in Qum that he received all his advanced spiritual and intellectual

training, and he was to retain a deep sense of identification with the city throughout the rest of his

life. It is possible, indeed, although not in a reductive sense, to describe him as a product of Qum. In

1980, when addressing a group of visitors from Qum, he declared: "Wherever I may be, I am a

After his arrival in Qum in 1922 or 1923, the Imam first devoted himself to completing the

preliminary stage of madrasa education known as sutuh; this he did by studying with teachers such

as Shaykh Muhammad Riza Najafi Masjid-i Shahi, Mirza Muhammad Taqi Khwansari, and Sayyid

'Ali Yasribi Kashani. However, from his early days in Qum, the Imam gave an indication that he was

destined to become more than another great authority on Ja'fari jurisprudence. He showed an

exceptional interest in subjects that not only were usually absent from the madrasa curriculum but

were often an object of hostility and suspicion: philosophy, in its various traditional schools, and

gnosticism ('irfan). He began cultivating this interest by studying the Tafsir-i Safi, a commentary on

the Qur'an by the Sufistically-inclined Mulla Muhsin Fayz-i Kashani (d.1091/1680), together with

the late Ayatullah 'Ali Araki (d. 1994), then a young student like himself. His formal instruction in

gnosticism and the related discipline of ethics began with classes taught by Haji Mirza Javad Maliki-

Tabrizi, but this scholar died in 1304/1925. Similarly, the Imam was not able to benefit for long

from his first teacher in philosophy, Mirza 'Ali Akbar Hakim Yazdi, a pupil of the great master Mulla

Hadi Sabzavari (d.1295/1878), for Yazdi passed away in 1305/1926. Another of the Imam's early

instructors in philosophy was Sayyid Abu 'l-Hasan Qazvini (d. 1355/1976), a scholar of both

peripatetic and illuminationst philosophy; the Imam attended his circle until Qazvini's departure

from Qum in 1310/1931.

The teacher who had the most profound influence on Imam Khomeini's spiritual development was,

however, Mirza Muhammad 'Ali Shahabadi (d. 1328 Sh./1950); to him the Imam refers in a number

of his works as shaykhuna and 'arif-I kamil, and his relationship with him was that of a murid with

his murshid. When Shahabadi first came to Qum in 1307 Sh./1928, the young Imam asked him a

question concerning the nature of revelation, and was captivated by the answer he received.

At his insistent request, Shahabadi consented to teach him and a few other select students the Fusus

al-Hikam of Ibn 'Arabi. Although the basis of instruction was Da'ud Qaysari's commentary on the

Fusus, the Imam testified that Shahabadi also presented his own original insights on the text.

Among the other texts that Imam Khomeini studied with Shahabadi were the Manazil al-Sa'irin of

the Hanbali Sufi, Khwaja 'Abdullah Ansari (d.482/1089), and the Misbah al-Uns of Muhammad b.

Hamza Fanari (d. 834/1431), a commentary on the Mafatih al-Ghayb of Sadr al-Din Qunavi (d.

673/1274).

It is conceivable that the Imam derived from Shahabadi, at least in part, whether consciously or not,

the fusion of gnostic and political concerns that came to characterize his life. For this spiritual

master of the Imam was one of the relatively few 'ulama' in the time of Riza Shah to preach publicly

against the misdeeds of the regime, and in his Shadharat al-Ma'arif, a work primarily gnostic in

Gnosis and ethics were also the subject of the first classes taught by the Imam. The class on ethics

taught by Haji Javad Aqa Maliki Tabrizi were resumed, three years after his death, by Shahabadi, and

when Shahabadi left for Tehran in 1936 he assigned the class to Imam Khomeini. The class

consisted in the first place of a careful reading of Ansari's Manazil al-Sa'irin, but ranged beyond the

text to touch on a wide variety of contemporary concerns. It proved popular to the extent that the

townsfolk of Qum as well as the students of the religious sciences attended, and people are related

to have come from as far afield as Tehran and Isfahan simply to listen to the Imam. This popularity

of the Imam's lectures ran contrary to the policies of the Pahlavi regime, which wished to limit the

influence of the 'ulama' outside the religious teaching institution. The government therefore secured

the transfer of the lectures from the prestigious location of the Fayziya madrasa to the Mulla Sadiq

madrasa, which was unable to accommodate large crowds.

However, after the deposition of Riza Shah in 1941, the lectures returned to the Fayziya madrasa

and instantly regained their former popularity. The ability to address the people at large, not simply

his own colleagues within the religious institution, that the Imam displayed for the first time in these

lectures on ethics, was to play an important role in the political struggles he led in later years.

While teaching ethics to a wide and diverse audience, Imam Khomeini began teaching important

texts of gnosis, such as the section on the soul in al-Asfar al-Arba'a of Mulla Sadra (d. 1050/1640)

and Sabzavari's Sharh-I Manzuma, to a select group of young scholars that included Murtaza

Mutahhari and Husayn 'Ali Muntaziri, who subsequently became two of his principal collaborators

in the revolutionary movement he launched some three decades later.

As for the earliest writings of the Imam, they also indicate that his primary interest during his early

years in Qum was gnosis. In 1928, for example, he completed the Sharh Du'a' al-Sahar, a detailed

commentary on the supplicatory prayers recited throughout Ramadan by Imam Muhammad al-

Baqir; as with all Imam Khomeini's works on gnosis, the terminology of Ibn 'Arabi is frequently

encountered in this book. Two years later, he completed Misbah al-Hidaya ila 'l-Khilafa wa 'l-Wilaya,

a dense and systematic treatise on the main topics of gnosis. Another product of the same years of

concentration on gnosis was a series of glosses on Qaysari's commentary on the Fusus.

In a brief autobiography written for inclusion in a book published in 1934, the Imam wrote that he

spent most of his time studying and teaching the works of Mulla Sadra; that he had for several years

been studying gnosis with Shahabadi; and that at the same time he was attending the classes of

This situation was to change, but gnosis was for the Imam never simply a topic for study, teaching

and writing. It remained an integral part of his intellectual and spiritual personality, and as such

infused many of his ostensibly political activities in later years with an unmistakably gnostic element.

The Imam did not engage in any overt political activities during the 1930's. He always believed that

the leadership of political activities should be in the hands of the foremost religious scholars, and he

was therefore obliged to accept the decision of Ha'iri to remain relatively passive toward the

measures taken by Riza Shah against the traditions and culture of Islam in Iran. In any event, as a

still junior figure in the religious institution in Qum, he would have been in no position to mobilize

popular opinion on a national scale. He was nonetheless in contact with those few 'ulama' who did

openly challenge Riza Shah, not only Shahabadi, but also men such as Haji Nurullah Isfahani, Mirza

Sadiq Aqa Tabrizi, Aqazada Kifai, and Sayyid Hasan Mudarris. He expressed his own opinions of

the Pahlavi regime, the leading characteristics of which he identified as oppression and hostility to

He assumed a public political stance for the first time in a proclamation dated 15 Urdibihisht 1323/

4 May 1944 that called for action to deliver the Muslims of Iran and the entire Islamic world from

the tyranny of foreign powers and their domestic accomplices.

The Imam begins by citing Qur'an, 34:46 ("Say: 'I enjoin but one thing upon you, that you rise up

for Allah, in pairs and singly, and then reflect'"). This is the same verse that opens the chapter on

awakening (bab al-yaqza) at the very beginning of Ansari's Manazil al-Sa'irin, the handbook of

spiritual wayfaring first taught to the Imam by Shahabadi. The Imam's interpretation of "rising up"

is, however, both spiritual and political, both individual and collective, a rebellion against lassitude in

the self and corruption in society.

The same spirit of comprehensive revolt inspires the first work written by the Imam for publication,

Kashf al-Asrar (Tehran, 1324 Sh./1945). He is said to have completed the book in forty eight days

from a sense of urgency, and that it indeed met a need is proven by the fact that it went through two

impressions in its first year. The principal aim of the book, as reflected in its title, was to refute 'Ali

Akbar Hakamizada's Asrar-i Hazarsala, a work calling for a "reform" of Shi'i Islam. Similar attacks

on Shi'i tradition were being made in the same period by Shari'at Sanglaji (d.1944), an admirer of

Wahhabism despite that sect's marked hostility to Shi'ism, and Ahmad Kasravi (d. 1946), competent

as a historian but mediocre as a thinker. The Imam's vindication of such aspects of Shi'i practice as

the mourning ceremonies of Muharram, pilgrimage (ziyara) to the tombs of the Imams, and the

recitation of the supplicatory prayers composed by the Imams, was therefore a response to the

criticisms made by all three. Imam Khomeini connected their assaults on tradition with the antireligious

policies of Riza Shah and bitterly criticized the Pahlavi regime for destroying public

morality. He stopped short, however, of demanding the abolition of the monarchy, proposing

instead that an assembly of competent mujtahids should choose "a just monarch who will not

violate God's laws and will shun oppression and wrongdoing, who will not transgress against men's

be no doubt that the "better system" already envisaged by Imam Khomeini in 1944 was vilayat-i

faqih, which became the constitutional cornerstone of the Islamic Republic of Iran established in

1979.

When Shaykh 'Abd al-Karim Ha'iri died in 1936, the supervision of the religious institution in Qum

had been jointly assumed by Ayatullah Khwansari, Ayatullah Sadr, and Ayatullah Hujjat. A sense of

lack was nonetheless felt. When Ayatullah Abu 'l-Hasan Isfahani, the principal marja'-i taqlid of the

age residing in Najaf, died in 1946, the need for a centralized leadership of Shi'i Muslims became

more felt more acutely, and a search began for a single individual capable of fulfilling the duties and

functions of both Ha'iri and Isfahani. Ayatullah Burujirdi, then resident in Hamadan, was seen to be

the most suitable person available, and Imam Khomeini is said to have played an important role in

persuading him to come to Qum. In this he was no doubt motivated in part by the hope that

Burujirdi would adopt a firm position vis--vis Muhammad Riza Shah, the second Pahlavi ruler. This

hope was to remain largely unfulfilled. In April 1949, Imam Khomeini learned that Burujirdi was

engaged in negotiations with the government concerning possible emendations to the constitution

then in force, and he wrote him a letter expressing his anxieties about the possible consequences. In

1955, a nationwide campaign against the Baha'i sect was launched, for which the Imam sought to

recruit Burujirdi's support, but he had little success. As for religious personalities who were militantly

active in the political sphere at the time, notably Ayatullah Abu 'l-Qasim Kashani and Navvab Safavi,

the leader of the Fida'iyan-i Islam, the Imam's contacts with them were sporadic and inconclusive.

His reluctance for direct political involvement in this period was probably due to his belief that any

movement for radical change ought to be led by the senior echelons of the religious establishment.

In addition, the most influential personage on the crowded and confused political scene of the day

was the secular nationalist, Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq.

Imam Khomeini therefore concentrated during the years of Burujirdi's leadership in Qum on giving

instruction in fiqh and gathering round him students who later became his associates in the

movement that led to the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime, not only Mutahhari and Muntaziri, but

younger men such as Muhammad Javad Bahonar and 'Ali Akbar Hashimi-Rafsanjani. In 1946, he

began teaching usul al-fiqh at the kharij level, taking as his text the chapter on rational proofs from

the second volume of the Kifayat al-Usul of Akhund Muhammad Kazim Khurasani (d. 1329/1911).

Initially attended by no more than thirty students, the class became so popular in Qum that five

hundred were in attendance the third time it was offered. According to the reminiscences of some of

those who took the class, it was distinguished from other classes taught in Qum on the same subject

by the critical spirit the Imam instilled in his students, as well as his ability to connect fiqh with all

the other dimensions of Islam - ethical, gnostic, philosophical, political, and social.

The emphases of the Imam's activity began to change with the death of Burujirdi on March 31,

1961, for he now emerged as one of the successors to Burujirdi's position of leadership. This

emergence was signalled by the publication of some of his writings on fiqh, most importantly the

basic handbook of religious practice entitled, like others of its genre, Tauzih al-Masa'il. He was soon

accepted as marja'-i taqlid by a large number of Iranian Shi'is. His leadership role was, however,

destined to go far beyond that traditional for a marja'-i taqlid and to attain a comprehensiveness

unique in the history of the Shi'i 'ulama'.

This became apparent soon after the death of Burujirdi when Muhammad Riza Shah, secure in his

possession of power after the CIA-organized coup of August 1953, embarked on a series of

measures designed to eliminate all sources of opposition, actual or potential, and to incorporate Iran

firmly into American patterns of strategic and economic domination. In the autumn of 1962, the

government promulgated new laws governing elections to local and provincial councils which

deleted the former requirement that those elected be sworn into office on the Qur'an. Seeing in this

a plan to permit the infiltration of public life by the Baha'is, Imam Khomeini telegraphed both the

Shah and the prime minister of the day, warning them to desist from violating both the law of Islam

and the Iranian Constitution of 1907, failing which the 'ulama' would engage in a sustained campaign

of protest. Rejecting all compromise measures, the Imam was able to force the repeal of the laws in

question seven weeks after they had been promulgated. This achievement marked his emergence on

the scene as the principal voice of opposition to the Shah.

A more serious confrontation was not long in coming. In January 1963, the Shah announced a sixpoint

program of reform that he termed the White Revolution, an American-inspired package of

measures designed to give his regime a liberal and progressive facade. Imam Khomeini summoned a

meeting of his colleagues in Qum to press upon them the necessity of opposing the Shah's plans,

but they were initially hesitant. They sent one of their number, Ayatullah Kamalvand, to see the

Shah and gauge his intentions. Although the Shah showed no inclination to retreat or compromise,

it took further pressure by Imam Khomeini on the other senior 'ulama' of Qum to persuade them to

decree a boycott of the referendum that the Shah had planned to obtain the appearance of popular

approval for his White Revolution. For his own part, Imam Khomeini issued on January 22, 1963 a

strongly worded declaration denouncing the Shah and his plans. In imitation, perhaps, of his father,

who had taken an armored column to Qum in 1928 in order to intimidate certain outspoken 'ulama',

the Shah came to Qum two days later. Faced with a boycott by all the dignitaries of the city, he

delivered a speech harshly attacking the 'ulama' as a class.

On January 26, the referendum was held, with a low turnout that reflected the growing heed paid by

the Iranian people to Imam Khomeini's directives. He continued his denunciation of the Shah's

programs, issuing a manifesto that also bore the signatures of eight other senior scholars. In it he

listed the various ways in which the Shah had violated the constition, condemned the spread of

moral corruption in the country, and accused the Shah of comprehensive submission to America

and Israel: "I see the solution to lie in this tyrannical government being removed, for the crime of

violating the ordinances of Islam and trampling the constitution, and in a government taking its

decreed that the Nauruz celebrations for the Iranian year 1342 (which fell on March 21, 1963) be

cancelled as a sign of protest against government policies.

The very next day, paratroopers were sent to the Fayziya madrasa in Qum, the site where the Imam

delivered his public speeches. They killed a number of students, beat and arrested a number of

others, and ransacked the building. Unintimidated, the Imam continued his attacks on the regime.

On April 1, he denounced the persistent silence of certain apolitical 'ulama' as "tantamount to

collaboration with the tyrannical regime," and one day later proclaimed political neutrality under the

emissaries to the houses of the 'ulama' in Qum to threaten them with the destruction of their homes,

the Imam reacted contemptuously by referring to the Shah as "that little man (mardak)." Then, on

April 3, 1963, the fortieth day after the attack on the Fayziya madrasa, he described the Iranian

government as being determined to eradicate Islam at the behest of America and Israel and himself

as resolved to combat it.

Confrontation turned to insurrection some two months later. The beginning of Muharram, always a

time of heightened religious awareness and sensitivity, saw demonstrators in Tehran carrying

pictures of the Imam and denouncing the Shah in front of his own palace. On the afternoon of

'Ashura (June 3, 1963), Imam Khomeini delivered a speech at the Fayziya madrasa in which he drew

parallels between the Umayyad caliph Yazid and the Shah and warned the Shah that if he did not

change his ways the day would come when the people would offer up thanks for his departure from

the Shah was indeed obliged to leave Iran amidst scenes of popular rejoicing. The immediate effect

of the Imam's speech was, however, his arrest two days later at 3 o'clock in the morning by a group

of commandos who hastily transferred him to the Qasr prison in Tehran.

As dawn broke on June 3, the news of his arrest spread first through Qum and then to other cities.

In Qum, Tehran, Shiraz, Mashhad and Varamin, masses of angry demonstrators were confronted by

tanks and ruthlessly slaughtered. It was not until six days later that order was fully restored. This

uprising of 15 Khurdad 1342 (the day in the Iranian calendar on which it began) marked a turning

point in Iranian history. Henceforth the repressive and dictatorial nature of the Shah's regime,

reinforced by the unwavering support of the United States, was constantly intensified, and with it

the prestige of Imam Khomeini as the only figure of note - whether religious or secular - willing to

challenge him. The arrogance imbuing the Shah's policies also caused a growing number of the

'ulama' to abandon their quietism and align themselves with the radical goals set forth by the Imam.

The movement of 15 Khurdad may therefore be characterized as the prelude to the Islamic

Revolution of 1978-79; the goals of that revolution and its leadership had already been determined.

After nineteen days in the Qasr prison, Imam Khomeini was moved first to the 'Ishratabad military

base and then to a house in the Davudiya section of Tehran where he was kept under surveillance.

Despite the killings that had taken place during the uprising, mass demonstrations were held in

Tehran and elsewhere demanding his release, and some of his colleagues came to the capital from

Qum to lend their support to the demand. It was not, however, until April 7, 1964 that he was

released, no doubt on the assumption that imprisonment had tempered his views and that the

movement he had led would quietly subside. Three days after his release and return to Qum, he

dispelled such illusions by refuting officially inspired rumors that he had come to an understanding

with the Shah's regime and by declaring that the movement inaugurated on 15 Khurdad would

continue. Aware of the persisting differences in approach between the Imam and some of the other

senior religious scholars, the regime had also attempted to discredit him by creating dissension in

Qum.

These attempts, too, were unsuccessful, for early in June 1964 all the major 'ulama' put their

signatures to declarations commemorating the first anniversary of the uprising of 15 Khurdad.

Despite its failure to sideline or silence Imam Khomeini, the Shah's regime continued its pro-

American policies unwaveringly. In the autumn of 1964, it concluded a status of forces agreement

with the United States that provided immunity from prosecution for all American personnel in Iran

and their dependents. This occasioned the Imam to deliver what was perhaps the most vehement

speech of the entire struggle against the Shah; certainly one of his close associates, Ayatullah

in exchange for a $200 million loan that would be of benefit only to the Shah and his associates, and

described as traitors all those in the Majlis who voted in favor of it; the government lacked all

Shortly before dawn on November 4, 1964, again a detachment of commandos surrounded the

Imam's house in Qum, arrested him, and this time took him directly to Mehrabad airport in Tehran

for immediate banishment to Turkey. The decision to deport rather than arrest Imam Khomeini and

imprison him in Iran was based no doubt on the hope that in exile he would fade from popular

memory. Physical elimination would have been fraught with the danger of an uncontrollable popular

uprising. As for the choice of Turkey, this reflected the security cooperation existing between the

Shah's regime and Turkey.

The Imam was first lodged in room 514 of Bulvar Palas Oteli in Ankara, a moderately comfortable

hotel in the Turkish capital, under the joint surveillance of Iranian and Turkish security officials. On

November 12, he was moved from Ankara to Bursa, where he was to reside another eleven months.

The stay in Turkey cannot have been congenial, for Turkish law forbade Imam Khomeini to wear

the cloak and turban of the Muslim scholar, an identity which was integral to his being; the sole

son, Hajj Mustafa Khumayni; he was also permitted to receive occasional visitors from Iran, and was

supplied with a number of books on fiqh. He made use of his forced stay in Bursa to compile Tahrir

al-Wasila, a two-volume compendium on questions of jurisprudence. Important and distinctive are

the fatvas this volume contains, grouped under the headings of al-amr bi 'l-ma'ruf wa 'l-nahy 'an almunkar

and difa'.

The Imam decrees, for example, that "if it is feared that the political and economic domination (by

foreigners) over an Islamic land will lead to the enslavement and weakening of the Muslims, then

such domination must be repelled by appropriate means, including passive resistance, the boycott of

foreign goods, and the abandonment of all dealings and association with the foreigners in question."

Similarly, "if an attack by foreigners on one of the Islamic states is anticipated, it is incumbent on all

Islamic states to repel the attack by all possible means; indeed, this is incumbent on the Muslims as a

On September 5, 1965, Imam Khomeini left Turkey for Najaf in Iraq, where he was destined to

spend thirteen years. As a traditional center of Shi'i learning and pilgrimage, Najaf was clearly a

preferable and more congenial place of exile. It had, moreover, already functioned as a stronghold of

'ulama' opposition to the Iranian monarchy during the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1909.

But it was not in order to accommodate the Imam that the Shah arranged for his transfer to Najaf.

First, there was continuing disquiet among the Imam's followers at his forced residence in Bursa,

away from the traditional milieu of the Shi'i madrasa; such objections could be met by moving him

to Najaf. Second, it was hoped that once in Najaf, the Imam would either be overshadowed by the

prestigious 'ulama' there, men such as Ayatullah Abu 'l-Qasim Khu'i (d. 1995), or that he would

challenge their distaste for political activism and squander his energies on confronting them. He

skirted this dual danger by proffering them his respect while continuing to pursue the goals he had

set himself before leaving Iran. Another pitfall he avoided was association with the Iraqi government

which occasionally had its own differences with the Shah's regime and was of a mind to use the

Imam's presence in Najaf for its own purposes.

The Imam declined the opportunity to be interviewed on Iraqi television soon after his arrival, and

resolutely kept his distance from succeeding Iraqi administrations.

Once settled in Najaf, Imam Khomeini began teaching fiqh at the Shaykh Murtaza Ansari madrasa.

His lectures were well attended, by students not only from Iran but also from Iraq, India, Pakistan,

Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf states. In fact, a mass migration to Najaf from Qum and other

centers of religious learning in Iran was proposed to the Imam, but he advised against it as a

measure bound to depopulate Qum and weaken it as a center of religious guidance.

It was also at the Shaykh Murtaza Ansari madrasa that he delivered, between January 21 and

February 8, 1970, his celebrated lectures on vilayat-i faqih, the theory of governance that was to be

implemented after the triumph of the Islamic Revolution. (The text of these lectures was published

in Najaf, not long after their delivery, under the title Vilayat-i Faqih ya Hukumat-i Islami ; a slightly

abbreviated Arabic translation soon followed). This theory, which may be summarized as the

assumption by suitably qualified 'ulama' of the political and juridical functions of the Twelfth Imam

during his occultation, had already been put forward, somewhat tentatively, in his first published

work, Kashf al-Asrar. Now he presented it as the self-evident and incontestable consequence of the

Shi'i doctrine of the Imamate, citing and analyzing in support of it all relevant texts from the Qur'an

and the traditions of the Prophet (s.a.w.s) and the Twelve Imams (a.s.) He emphasized also the harm

that had come to Iran (as well as other Muslim countries) from abandoning Islamic law and

government and relinquishing the political realm to the enemies of Islam. Finally, he delineated a

program for the establishment of an Islamic government, laying particular stress on the

responsibilities of the 'ulama' to transcend their petty concerns and to address the people fearlessly:

"It is the duty of all of us to overthrow the taghut, the illegitimate political powers that now rule the

The text of the lectures on vilayat-i faqih was smuggled back to Iran by visitors who came to see the

Imam in Najaf, as well as by ordinary Iranians who came on pilgrimage to the shrine of Hazrat 'Ali

(a.s.) The same channels were used to convey to Iran the numerous letters and proclamations in

which the Imam commented on the events that took place in his homeland during the long years of

exile. The first such document, a letter to the Iranian 'ulama' assuring them of the ultimate downfall

of the Shah's regime, is dated April 16, 1967. On the same day he also wrote to prime minister Amir

On the occasion of the Six Day War in June 1967, the Imam issued a declaration forbidding any type

of dealing with Israel as well as the consumption of Israeli goods. This declaration was widely and

openly publicized in Iran, which led to the ransacking of Imam Khomeini's house in Qum and the

arrest of Hajj Sayyid Ahmad Khumayni, his second son, who had been living there. (Some of the

unpublished works of the Imam were lost or destroyed on this occasion). It was also at this time that

the Shah's regime contemplated moving the Imam from Iraq to India, a location from which

communications with Iran would have been far more difficult, but the plan was thwarted. Other

developments on which the Imam commented from Najaf were the extravagant celebrations of

2500 years of Iranian monarchy in October 1971 ("it is the duty of the Iranian people to refrain

from participation in this illegitimate festival"); the formal establishment of a one-party system in

Iran in February 1975 (the Imam prohibited membership in the party, the Hizb-i Rastakhiz, in a

fatva issued the following month); and the substitution, in the same month, of the imperial

(shahanshahi) calendar for the solar Hijri calendar that had been official in Iran until that time. Some

developments were met with fatvas rather than proclamations: for example, the Imam rejected as

incompatible with Islam the Family Protection Law of 1967 and classified as adultresses women

Imam Khomeini had also to deal with changing circumstances in Iraq.

The Ba'th Party, fundamentally hostile to religion, had come to power in July 1967 and soon began

exerting pressure on the scholars of Najaf, both Iraqi and Iranian. In 1971, as Iraq and Iran entered

a state of sproradic and undeclared war with each other, the Iraqi regime began expelling from its

territory Iranians whose forebears had in some cases been residing there for generations. The Imam,

who until that point had scrupulously kept his distance from Iraqi officialdom, now addressed

himself directly to the Iraqi leadership condemning its actions.

Imam Khomeini was, in fact, constantly and acutely aware of the connections between Iranian

affairs and those of the Muslim world in general and the Arab lands in particular. This awareness led

him to issue from Najaf a proclamation to the Muslims of the world on the occasion of the hajj in

1971, and to comment, with special frequency and emphasis, on the problems posed by Israel for

the Muslim world.

The Imam's strong concern for the Palestine question led him to issue a fatva on August 27, 1968

authorizing the use of religious monies (vujuh-i shar'i) to support the nascent activities of al-'Asifa,

the armed wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization; this was confirmed by a similar and more

The distribution in Iran, on however limited a scale, of the proclamations and fatvas of Imam

Khomeini was in itself enough to ensure that his name not be forgotten during the years of exile.

Equally important, the movement of Islamic opposition to the Shah's regime that had been

inaugurated by the uprising of 15 Khurdad continued to develop despite the brutality unhesitatingly

dispensed by the Shah. Numerous groups and individuals explicitly owed their allegiance to the

Imam. Soon after his exiling there came into being an organization called Hay'atha-yi Mu'talifa-yi

Islami (the Allied Islamic Associations), headquartered in Tehran but with branches throughout

Iran. Active in it were many who had been students of the Imam in Qum and who came to assume

important responsibilities after the revolution, men such as Hashimi-Rafsanjani and Javad Bahunar.

In January 1965, four members of the organization assassinated Hasan 'Ali Mansur, the prime

minister who had been responsible for the exiling of the Imam.

There were no individuals designated, even clandestinely, as Imam Khomeini's authorized

representatives in Iran while he was in exile.

However, senior 'ulama' such as Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari, Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn

Bihishti (d. 1981), and Ayatullah Husayn 'Ali Muntaziri, were in contact with him, directly and

indirectly, and were known to speak on his behalf in important matters. Like their younger

counterparts in the Hay'atha-yi Mu'talafa-yi Islami, all three went on to perform important functions

during and after the revolution.

The continued growth of the Islamic movement during Imam Khomeini's exile should not be

attributed exclusively to his abiding influence or to the activity of 'ulama' associated with him.

Important, too, were the lectures and books of 'Ali Shari'ati (d. 1977), a university-educated

intellectual whose understanding and presentation of Islam were influenced by Western ideologies,

including Marxism, to a degree that many 'ulama' regarded as dangerously syncretistic. When the

Imam was asked to comment on the theories of Shari'ati, both by those who supported them and by

those who opposed them, he discreetly refrained from doing so, in order not to create a division

within the Islamic movement that would have benefited the Shah's regime.

The most visible sign of the persisting popularity of Imam Khomeini in the pre-revolutionary years,

above all at the heart of the religious institution in Qum, came in June 1975 on the anniversary of

the uprising of 15 Khurdad. Students at the Fayziya madrasa began holding a demonstration within

the confines of the building, and a sympathetic crowd assembled outside. Both gatherings continued

for three days until they were attacked on the ground by commandos and from the air by a military

helicopter, with numerous deaths resulting. The Imam reacted with a message in which he declared

the events in Qum and similar disturbances elsewhere to be a sign of hope that "freedom and

the revolution came indeed some two and a half years later.

The chain of events that ended in February 1979 with the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime and the

foundation of the Islamic Republic began with the death in Najaf on October 23, 1977 of Hajj

Sayyid Mustafa Khomeini, unexpectedly and under mysterious circumstances.

This death was widely attributed to the Iranian security police, SAVAK, and protest meetings took

place in Qum, Tehran, Yazd, Mashhad, Shiraz, and Tabriz. Imam Khomeini himself, with the

equanimity he customarily displayed in the face of personal loss, described the death of his son as

one of the "hidden favors" (altaf-i khafiya) of God, and advised the Muslims of Iran to show

The esteem in which Imam Khomeini was held and the reckless determination of the Shah's regime

to undermine that esteem were demonstrated once again on January 7, 1978 when an article

appeared in the semi-official newspaper Ittila'at attacking him in scurrilous terms as a traitor working

together with foreign enemies of the country. The next day a furious mass protest took place in

Qum; it was suppressed by the security forces with heavy loss of life. This was the first in a series of

popular confrontations that, gathering momentum throughout 1978, soon turned into a vast

revolutionary movement, demanding the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime and the installation of an

Islamic government.

The martyrs of Qum were commemorated forty days later with demonstrations and shop closures in

every major city of Iran.

Particularly grave were the disturbances in Tabriz, which ended only after more than 100 people had

been killed by the Shah's troops. On March 29, the fortieth day after the killings in Tabriz was

marked by a further round of demonstrations, in some fifty-five Iranian cities; this time the heaviest

casualties occurred in Yazd, where security forces opened fire on a gathering in the main mosque. In

early May, it was Tehran itself that saw the principal violence; armored columns appeared on the

streets for the first time since June 1963 in order to contain the trend to revolution. In June, the

Shah found it politic to make a number of superficial concessions - such as the repeal of the

"imperial calendar" - to the forces opposing him, but repression also continued. When the

government lost control of Isfahan on August 17, the army assaulted the city and killed hundreds of

unarmed demonstrators. Two days later, 410 people were burned to death behind the locked doors

of a cinema in Abadan, and the government was plausibly held responsible.

On 'Id al-fitr, which that year fell on September 4, marches took place in all major cities, with an

estimated total of four million participants. The demand was loudly voiced for the abolition of

monarchy and the foundation of an Islamic government under the leadership of Imam Khomeini.

Faced with the mounting tide of revolution, the Shah decreed martial law and forbade further

demonstrations. On September 9, a crowd gathered at the Maydan-I Zhala (subsequently renamed

Maydan-I Shuhada') in Tehran was attacked by troops that had blocked all exits from the square,

and some 2000 people were killed at this location alone. Another 2000 were killed elsewhere in

Tehran by American-supplied military helicopters hovering overhead. This day of massacre, which

came to be known as Black Friday, marked the point of no return. Too much blood had been spilt

for the Shah to have any hope of survival, and the army itself began to tire of the task of slaughter.

As these events were unfolding in Iran, Imam Khomeini delivered a whole series of messages and

speeches which reached his homeland not only in printed form but also increasingly on tape

cassettes. His voice could be heard congratulating the people for their sacrifices, denouncing the

Shah in categorical fashion as a criminal, and underlining the responsibility of the United States for

the killings and the repression. (Ironically, US President Carter had visited Tehran on New Year's

Eve 1977 and lauded the Shah for creating "an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas

continued its military and political support of the Shah uninterrupted by anything but the most

superficial hesitation). Most importantly, the Imam recognized that a unique juncture had been

reached in Iranian history, that a genuinely revolutionary momentum had come into being which if

dissipated would be impossible to rebuild. He therefore warned against any tendency to compromise

or to be deceived by the sporadic conciliatory gestures of the Shah.

Thus on the occasion of 'Id al-Fitr, when mass demonstrations had passed off with deceptive

peacefulness in Tehran, he issued the following declaration: "Noble people of Iran ! Press forward

with your movement and do not slacken for a minute, as I know full well you will not! Let no one

imagine that after the blessed month of Ramadan his God-given duties have changed. These

demonstrations that break down tyranny and advance the goals of Islam are a form of worship that

is not confined to certain months or days, for the aim is to save the nation, to enact Islamic justice,

In one of the numerous miscalculations that marked his attempts to destroy the revolution, the Shah

decided to seek the deportation of Imam Khomeini from Iraq, on the assumption, no doubt, that

once removed from the prestigious location of Najaf and its proximity to Iran, his voice would

somehow be silenced. The agreement of the Iraqi government was obtained at a meeting between

the Iraqi and Iranian foreign ministers in New York, and on September 24, 1978, the Imam's house

in Najaf was surrounded by troops. He was informed that his continued residence in Iraq was

contingent on his abandoning political activity, a condition he was sure to reject. On October 3, he

left Iraq for Kuwait, but was refused entry at the border. After a period of hesitation in which

Algeria, Lebanon and Syria were considered as possible destinations, Imam Khomeini embarked for

Paris, on the advice of his second son, Hajj Sayyid Ahmad Khomeini, who by now had joined him.

Once arrived in Paris, the Imam took up residence in the suburb of Neauphle-le-Chateau in a house

that had been rented for him by Iranian exiles in France.

Residence in a non-Muslim land was no doubt experienced by Imam Khomeini as irksome, and in

the declaration he issued from Neauphle-le-Chateau on October 11, 1978, the fortieth day after the

massacres of Black Friday, he announced his intention of moving to any Muslim country that

addition, his forced removal from Najaf increased popular anger in Iran still further. It was,

however, the Shah's regime that turned out to be the ultimate loser from this move. Telephonic

communications with Tehran were far easier from Paris than they had been from Najaf, thanks to

the Shah's determination to link Iran with the West in every possible way, and the messages and

instructions the Imam issued flowed forth uninterrupted from the modest command center he

established in a small house opposite his residence. Moreover, a host of journalists from across the

world now made their way to France, and the image and the words of the Imam soon became a daily

feature in the world's media.

In Iran meanwhile, the Shah was continuously reshaping his government. First he brought in as

prime minister Sharif-Imami, an individual supposedly close to conservative elements among the

'ulama. Then, on November 6, he formed a military government under General Ghulam-Riza

Azhari, a move explicitly recommended by the United States. These political maneuvrings had

essentially no effect on the progress of the revolution. On November 23, one week before the

beginning of Muharram, the Imam issued a declaration in which he likened the month to "a divine

sword in the hands of the soldiers of Islam, our great religious leaders and respected preachers, and

all the followers of Imam Husayn, sayyid al-shuhada'." They must, he continued, "make maximum

use of it; trusting in the power of God, they must tear out the remaining roots of this tree of

oppression and treachery." As for the military government, it was contrary to the shari'ah, and

Vast demonstrations unfurled across Iran as soon as Muharram began.

Thousands of people donned white shrouds as a token of readiness for martyrdom and were cut

down as they defied the nightly curfew. On Muharram 9, a million people marched in Tehran

demanding the overthrow of the monarchy, and the following day, 'Ashura, more than two million

demonstrators approved by acclamation a seventeen-point declaration of which the most important

demand was the formation of an Islamic government headed by the Imam. Killings by the army

continued, but military discipline began to crumble, and the revolution acquired an economic

dimension with the proclamation of a national strike on December 18.

With his regime crumbling, the Shah now attempted to coopt secular, liberal-nationalist politicians in

order to forestall the foundation of an Islamic government. On January 3, 1979, Shahpur Bakhtiyar

of the National Front (Jabha-yi Milli) was appointed prime minister to replace General Azhari, and

plans were drawn up for the Shah to leave the country for what was advertised as a temporary

absence. On January 12, the formation of a nine-member regency council was announced; headed

by Jalal al-Din Tihrani, an individual proclaimed to have religious credentials, it was to represent the

Shah's authority in his absence. None of these maneuvers distracted the Imam from the goal now

increasingly within reach. The very next day after the formation of the regency council, he

proclaimed from Neauphle-le-Chateau the formation of the Council of the Islamic Revolution

(Shaura-yi Inqilab-i Islami), a body entrusted with establishing a transitional government to replace

the Bakhtiyar administration. On January 16, amid scenes of feverish popular rejoicing, the Shah left

Iran for exile and death.

What remained now was to remove Bakhtiyar and prevent a military coup d'etat enabling the Shah

to return. The first of these aims came closer to realization when Sayyid Jalal al-Din Tihrani came to

Paris in order to seek a compromise with Imam Khomeini. He refused to see him until he resigned

from the regency council and pronounced it illegal. As for the military, the gap between senior

generals, unconditionally loyal to the Shah, and the growing number of officers and recruits

sympathetic to the revolution, was constantly growing. When the United States dispatched General

Huyser, commander of NATO land forces in Europe, to investigate the possibility of a military

coup, he was obliged to report that it was pointless even to consider such a step.

Conditions now seemed appropriate for Imam Khomeini to return to Iran and preside over the final

stages of the revolution. After a series of delays, including the military occupation of Mehrabad

airport from January 24 to 30, the Imam embarked on a chartered airliner of Air France on the

evening of January 31 and arrived in Tehran the following morning. Amid unparalleled scenes of

popular joy - it has been estimated that more than ten million people gathered in Tehran to welcome

the Imam back to his homeland - he proceeded to the cemetery of Bihisht-i Zahra to the south of

Tehran where the martyrs of the revolution lay buried. There he decried the Bakhtiyar

administration as the "last feeble gasp of the Shah's regime" and declared his intention of appointing

February 5. Its leadership was entrusted to Mahdi Bazargan, an individual who had been active for

many years in various Islamic organizations, most notably the Freedom Movement (Nahzat-i Azadi).

The decisive confrontation came less than a week later. Faced with the progressive disintegration of

the armed forces and the desertion of many officers and men, together with their weapons, to the

Revolutionary Committees that were springing up everywhere, Bakhtiyar decreed a curfew in Tehran

to take effect at 4 p.m. On February 10. Imam Khomeini ordered that the curfew should be defied

and warned that if elements in the army loyal to the Shah did not desist from killing the people, he

Council withdrew its support from Bakhtiyar, and on February 12, 1979, all organs of the regime,

political, administrative, and military, finally collapsed.

The revolution had triumphed.

Clearly no revolution can be regarded as the work of a single man, nor can its causes be interpreted

in purely ideological terms; economic and social developments had helped to prepare the ground for

the revolutionary movement of 1978-79. There was also marginal involvement in the revolution,

particularly during its final stages when its triumph seemed assured, by secular, liberal-nationalist,

and leftist elements. But there can be no doubting the centrality of Imam Khomeini's role and the

integrally Islamic nature of the revolution he led. Physically removed from his countrymen for

fourteen years, he had an unfailing sense of the revolutionary potential that had surfaced and was

able to mobilize the broad masses of the Iranian people for the attainment of what seemed to many

inside the country (including his chosen premier, Bazargan) a distant and excessively ambitious goal.

His role pertained, moreover, not merely to moral inspiration and symbolic leadership; he was also

the operational leader of the revolution. Occasionally he accepted advice on details of strategy from

persons in Iran, but he took all key decisions himself, silencing early on all advocates of compromise

with the Shah. It was the mosques that were the organizational units of the revolution and mass

prayers, demonstrations and martyrdom that were - until the very last stage - its principal weapons.

Imam Khomeini's role was also central in shaping the new political order that emerged from the

revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran. At first it appeared that he might exercise his directive role

from Qum, for he moved there from Tehran on February 29, causing Qum to become in effect a

second capital of Iran. On March 30 and 31, a nationwide referendum resulted in a massive vote in

favor of the establishment of an Islamic Republic. The Imam proclaimed the next day, April 1, 1979,

order continued with the election, on August 3, of an Assembly of Experts (Majlis-I Khubragan),

entrusted with the task of reviewing a draft constitution that had been put forward on June 18; fiftyfive

of the seventy-three persons elected were religious scholars.

It was not however to be expected that a smooth transition from the old regime would prove

possible. The powers and duties of the Council of the Islamic Revolutionary, which was intended to

serve as an interim legislature, were not clearly delineated from those of the provisional government

headed by Bazargan. More importantly, significant differences of outlook and approach separated

the two bodies from each other. The council, composed predominantly of 'ulama', favored

immediate and radical change and sought to strengthen the revolutionary organs that had come into

being - the revolutionary committees, the revolutionary courts charged with punishing members of

the former regime charged with serious crimes, and the Corps of Guards of the Islamic Revolution

(Sipah-I Pasdaran-I Inqilab-I Islami), established on May 5, 1979. The government, headed by

Bazargan and comprising mainly liberal technocrats of Islamic orientation, sought as swift a

normalization of the situation as possible and the gradual phasing out of the revolutionary

institutions.

Although Imam Khomeini encouraged members of the two bodies to cooperate and refrained, on

most occasions, from arbitrating their differences, his sympathies were clearly with the Council of

the Islamic Revolution. On July 1, Bazargan offered the Imam his resignation. It was refused, and

four members of the council - Rafsanjani, Bahunar, Mahdavi-Kani, and Ayatullah Sayyid 'Ali

Khamna'i - joined Bazargan's cabinet in an effort to improve the coordination of the two bodies. In

addition to these frictions at the governmental level, a further element of instability was provided by

the terrorist activities of shadowy groups that were determined to rob the nascent Islamic republic

of some of its most capable personalities. Thus on May 1, 1979, Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari, a

leading member of the Council of the Islamic Revolution and a former pupil close to the Imam's

heart, was assassinated in Tehran. For once, the Imam wept in an open display of grief.

The final break between Bazargan and the revolution came as a consequence of the occupation of

the United States embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979 by a coalition of students from the

universities of Tehran. Despite declarations of willingness to "honor the will of the Iranian people"

and its recognition of the Islamic Republic, the American government had admitted the Shah to the

United States on October 22, 1979.

The pretext was his need for medical treatment, but it was widely feared in Iran that his arrival in

America, where large numbers of high-ranking officials of the previous regime had gathered, might

be the prelude to an American-sponsored attempt to restore him to power, on the lines of the

successful CIA coup of August 1953. The Shah's extradition to Iran was therefore demanded by the

students occupying the embassy as a condition for their liberating the hostages they were holding

there.

It is probable that the students had cleared their action in advance with close associates of Imam

Khomeini, for he swiftly extended his protection to them, proclaiming their action "a greater

this "second revolution," America would be "unable to do a damned thing (Amrika hich ghalati

Iran, but a military expedition mounted by the United States on April 22, 1980 to rescue the

American hostages and possibly, too, to attack sensitive sites in Tehran, came to an abrupt and

humiliating end when the American gunships crashed into each other in a sandstorm near Tabas in

south-eastern Iran. On April 7, the United States had formally broken diplomatic ties with Iran, a

Two days after the occupation of the US embassy, Bazargan once again offered his resignation, and

this time it was accepted. In addition, the provisional government was dissolved, and the Council of

the Islamic Revolution temporarily assumed the task of running the country. This marked the

definitive departure of Bazargan and like-minded individuals from the scene; henceforth the term

"liberal" became a pejorative designation for those who questioned the fundamental tendencies of

the revolution. In addition, the students occupying the embassy had access to extensive files the

Americans had kept on various Iranian personalities who had frequented the embassy over the years;

these documents were now published and discredited the personalities involved. Most importantly,

the occupation of the embassy constituted a "second revolution" in that Iran now offered a unique

example of defiance of the American superpower and became established for American

policymakers as their principal adversary in the Middle East.

The enthusiasm aroused by the occupation of the embassy also helped to ensure a large turnout for

the referendum that was held on December 2 and 3, 1979 to ratify the constitution that had been

approved by the Assembly of Experts on November 15. The constitution, which was

overwhelmingly approved, differed greatly from the original draft, above all through its inclusion of

the principle of vilayat-i faqih as its basic and determining principle.

Mentioned briefly in the preamble, it was spelled out in full in Article Five: "During the Occultation

of the Lord of the Age (Sahib al-Zaman; i.e., the Twelfth Imam) the governance and leadership of

the nation devolve upon the just and pious faqih who is acquainted with the circumstances of his

age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability; and recognized and accepted as

leader (rahbar) by the majority of the people. In the event that no faqih should be so recognized by

the majority, the leader, or leadership council, composed of fuqaha' possessing the aforementioned

qualifications, will assume these responsibilities." Article 109 specified the qualifications and

attributes of the leader as "suitability with respect to learning and piety, as required for the functions

of mufti and marja'." Article 110 listed his powers, which include supreme command of the armed

forces, appointment of the head of the judiciary, signing the decree formalizing the election of the

These articles formed the constitutional basis for Imam Khomeini's leadership role. In addition,

from July 1979 onwards, he had been appointing Imam Jum'a's for every major city, who not only

delivered the Friday sermon but also acted as his personal representatives.

Most government institutions also had a representative of the Imam assigned to them. However, the

ultimate source of his influence was his vast moral and spiritual prestige, which led to him being

designated primarily as Imam, in the sense of one dispensing comprehensive leadership to the

On January 23, 1980, Imam Khomeini was brought from Qum to Tehran to receive treatment for a

heart ailment. After thirty-nine days in hospital, he took up residence in the north Tehran suburb of

Darband, and on April 22 he moved into a modest house in Jamaran, another suburb to the north

of the capital. A closely guarded compound grew up around the house, and it was there that he was

destined to spend the rest of his life.

On January 25, during the Imam's hospitalization, Abu 'l-Hasan Bani Sadr, a French-educated

economist, was elected first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. His success had been made

possible in part by the Imam's decision that it was not opportune to have a religious scholar stand

for election. This event, followed on March 14 by the first elections to the Majlis, might have

counted as a further step to the institutionalization and stabilization of the political system.

However, Bani Sadr's tenure, together with the tensions that soon arose between him and a majority

of the deputies in the Majlis, occasioned a severe crisis that led ultimately to Bani Sadr's dismissal.

For the president, his inherent megalomania aggravated by his victory at the polls, was reluctant to

concede supremacy to Imam Khomeini, and he therefore attempted to build up a personal

following, consisting largely of former leftists who owed their positions exclusively to him. In this

enterprise, he inevitably clashed with the newly formed Islamic Republic Party (Hizb-i Jumhuri-yi

Islami), headed by Ayatullah Bihishti, which dominated the Majlis and was loyal to what was referred

to as "the line of the Imam" (khatt-i Imam). As he had earlier done with the disputes between the

provisional government and the Council of the Islamic Revolution, the Imam sought to reconcile

the parties, and on September 11 1980 appealed to all branches of government and their members

to set aside their differences.

While this new governmental crisis was brewing, on September 22, 1980, Iraq sent its forces across

the Iranian border and launched a war of aggression that was to last for almost eight years. Iraq

enjoyed financial support in this venture from the Arab states lining the Persian Gulf, above all from

Saudi Arabia. Imam Khomeini, however, correctly regarded the United States as the principal

instigator of the war from the outset, and American involvement became increasingly visible as the

war wore on. Although Iraq advanced territorial claims against Iran, the barely disguised purpose of

the aggression was to take advantage of the dislocations caused in Iran by the revolution, particularly

the weakening of the army through purges of disloyal officers, and to destroy the Islamic Republic.

As he had done during the revolution, Imam Khomeini insisted on an uncompromising stance and

inspired a steadfast resistance which prevented the easy Iraqi victory many foreign observers had

confidently foretold. Initially, however, Iraq enjoyed some success, capturing the port city of

Khurramshahr and encircling Abadan.

The conduct of the war became one more issue at dispute between Bani Sadr and his opponents.

Continuing his efforts at reconciling the factions, Imam Khomeini established a three-man

commission to investigate the complaints each had against the other. The commission reported on

June 1, 1981 that Bani Sadr was guilty of violating the constitution and contravening the Imam's

instructions.

He was accordingly declared incompetent by the Majlis to function as president, and the next day, in

accordance with Article 110 section (e) of the constitution, Imam Khomeini dismissed him. He went

into hiding, and on July 28 fled to Paris, disguised as a woman.

Toward the end of his presidency, Bani Sadr had allied himself with the Sazman-i Mujahidin-i Khalq

(Organization of People's Strugglers; however, the group is commonly known in Iran as munafiqin,

"hypocrites," not mujahidin, because of its members' hostility to the Islamic Republic). An

organization with a tortuous ideological and political history, it had hoped, like Bani Sadr, to displace

Imam Khomeini and capture power for itself. After Bani Sadr went into exile, members of the

organization embarked on a campaign of assassinating government leaders in the hope that the

Islamic Republic would collapse. Even before Bani Sadr fled, a massive explosion had destroyed the

headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party, killing more than seventy people including Ayatullah

Bihishti. On August 30, 1981, Muhammad 'Ali Raja'i, Bani Sadr's successor as president, was killed

in another explosion. Other assassinations followed over the next two years, including five Imam

Jum'a's as well as a host of lesser figures. Throughout these disasters, Imam Khomeini maintained

his customary composure, declaring, for example, after the assassination of Raja'i that the killings

would change nothing and in fact showed Iran to be "the most stable country in the world," given

defense against Iraq was indeed testimony to the roots the new order had struck and to the

undiminished prestige of Imam Khomeini as the leader of the nation.

Ayatullah Khamna'i, a longtime associate and devotee of the Imam, was elected president on

October 2, 1981, and he remained in this position until he succeeded him as leader of the Islamic

Republic on his death in 1989. No governmental crises comparable to those of the first years of the

Islamic Republic occurred during his tenure.

Nonetheless, structural problems persisted. The constitution provided that legislation passed by the

Majlis should be reviewed by a body of senior fuqaha' known as the Council of Guardians (Shaura-yi

Nagahban) to ensure its conformity with the provisions of Ja'fari fiqh. This frequently led to a

stalemate on a variety of important legislative issues. On at least two occasions, in October 1981 and

January 1983, Hashimi- Rafsanjani, then chairman of the Majlis, requested the Imam to arbitrate

decisively, drawing on the prerogatives inherent in the doctrine of vilayat-i faqih, in order to break

the deadlock. He was reluctant to do so, always preferring that a consensus should emerge.

However, on January 6, 1988, in a letter addressed to Khamna'i, the Imam put forward a farreaching

definition of vilayat-i faqih, now termed "absolute" (mutlaqa), which made it theoretically

possible for the leadership to override all conceivable objections to the policies it supported.

Governance, Imam Khomeini proclaimed, is the most important of all divine ordinances (ahkam-i

ilahi) and it takes precedence over secondary divine ordinances (ahkam-i far'iya-yi ilahiya). Not only

does the Islamic state permissibly enforce a large number of laws not mentioned specifically in the

sources of the shari'a, such as the prohibition of narcotics and the levying of customs dues; it can

also suspend the performance of a fundamental religious duty, the hajj, when this is necessitated by

mutlaqa-yi faqih might appear to be a justification for unlimited individual rule by the leader

(rahbar). One month later, however, Imam Khomeini delegated these broadly defined prerogatives

to a commission named the Assembly for the Determination of the Interest of the Islamic Order

(Majma'-i Tashkhis-i Maslahat-i Nizam-i Islami). This standing body has the power to settle

decisively all differences on legislation between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians.

The war against Iraq continued to preoccupy Iran until July 1988.

Iran had come to define its war aims as not simply the liberation of all parts of its territory occupied

by Iraq, but also the overhrow of the regime of Saddam Husayn. A number of military victories

made this goal appear attainable. On November 29, 1981, Imam Khomeini congratulated his

military commanders on successes achieved in Khuzistan, remarking that the Iraqis had been

since shortly after the outbreak of war, was liberated, and only small pockets of Iranian territory

remained in Iraqi hands. The Imam marked the occasion by condemning anew the Persian Gulf

which might have made possible the destruction of Saddam Husayn's regime, was lost as the tide of

war flowed back and forth. The United States was, in any event, determined to deny Iran a decisive

victory and stepped up its intervention in the conflict in a variety of ways. Finally, on July 2, 1988,

the US navy stationed in the Persian Gulf shot down a civilian Iranian airliner, with the loss of 290

passengers. With the utmost reluctance, Imam Khomeini agreed to end the war on the terms

specified in Resolution 598 of the United Nations Security Council, comparing his decision in a

Any notion that the acceptance of a ceasefire with Iraq signaled a diminution in the Imam's

readiness to confront the enemies of Islam was dispelled when, on February 14, 1989, he issued a

fatva calling for the execution of Salman Rushdie, author of the obscene and blasphemous novel,

The Satanic Verses, as well as those responsible for the publication and dissemination of the work.

The fatva received a great deal of support in the Muslim world as the most authoritative articulation

of popular outrage at Rushdie's gross insult to Islam. Although its demand remained unfulfilled, it

demonstrated plainly the consequences that would have to be faced by any aspiring imitator of

Rushdie, and thus had an important deterrent effect. Generally overlooked at the time was the firm

grounding of the Imam's fatva in the existing provisions of both Shi'i and Sunni jurisprudence; it

was not therefore innovative. What lent the fatva particular significance was rather its issuance by

the Imam as a figure of great moral authority.

The Imam had also gained the attention of the outside world, albeit in a less spectacular way, on

January 4, 1989, when he sent Mikhail Gorbachev, then general secretary of the Communist Party of

the Soviet Union, a letter in which he predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union and the

disappearance of communism: "Henceforth it will be necessary to look for communism in the

museums of political history of the world." He also warned Gorbachev and the Russian people

against replacing communism with Western-style materialism: "The basic problem of your country

has nothing to do with ownership, the economy, or freedom; it is the lack of a true belief in God,

Internally, however, the most important development in the last year of Imam Khomeini's life was,

without doubt, his dismissal of Ayatullah Muntaziri from the position of successor to the leadership

of the Islamic Republic. Once a student and close associate of the Imam, who had gone so far as to

call him "the fruit of my life," Muntaziri had had among his associates over the years persons

executed for counterrevolutionary activity, including a son-in-law, Mahdi Hashimi, and made

farreaching criticisms of the Islamic Republic, particularly with regard to judicial matters. On July 31,

1988, he wrote a letter to the Imam questioning what he regarded as unjustified executions of

members of the Sazman-i Mujahidin-i Khalq held in Iranian prisons after the organization, from its

base in Iraq, had made a large-scale incursion into Iranian territory in the closing stages of the Iran-

Iraq war. Matters came to a head the following year, and on March 28, 1989, the Imam wrote to

Muntaziri accepting his resignation from the succession, a resignation which under the

On June 3, 1989, after eleven days in hospital for an operation to stop internal bleeding, Imam

Khomeini lapsed into a critical condition and died. The outpouring of grief was massive and

spontaneous, the exact counterpoint to the vast demonstrations of joy that had greeted his return to

Iran a little over ten years earlier. Such was the press of mourners, estimated at some nine million,

that the body ultimately had to be transported by helicopter to its place of burial to the south of

Tehran on the road leading to Qum. A still expanding complex of structures has grown up around

the shrine of the Imam, making it likely that it will become the center of an entire new city devoted

to ziyara and religious learning.

The testament of Imam Khomeini was published soon after his death. A lengthy document, it

addresses itself principally to the various classes of Iranian society, urging them to do whatever is

necessary for the preservation and strengthening of the Islamic Republic.

Significantly, however, it begins with an extended meditation on the hadith-i thaqalayn: "I leave

among you two great and precious things: the Book of God and my progeny; they will never be

separated from each other until they meet me at the pool." The Imam interprets the misfortunes

that have befallen Muslims throughout history and more particularly in the present age as the result

of efforts precisely to disengage the Qur'an from the progeny of the Prophet (s.a.w.s.)

The legacy of Imam Khomeini was considerable. He had bequeathed to Iran not only a political

system enshrining the principles both of religious leadership and of an elected legislature and head

of the executive branch, but also a whole new ethos and self-image, a dignified stance of

independence vis-vis the West rare in the Muslim world. He was deeply imbued with the traditions

and worldview of Shi'i Islam, but he viewed the revolution he had led and the republic he had

founded as the nucleus for a worldwide awakening of all Muslims. He had sought to attain this goal

by, among other things, issuing proclamations to the hujjaj on a number of occasions and alerting

them to the dangers arising from American dominance of the Middle East, the tireless activity of

Israel for subverting the Muslim world, and the subservience to America and Israel of numerous

Middle Eastern governments. Unity between Shi'is and Sunnis was one of his lasting concerns; he

was, indeed, the first Shi'i authority to declare unconditionally valid prayers performed by Shi'is

It must finally be stressed that despite the amplitude of his political achievements, Imam Khomeini's

personality was essentially that of a gnostic for whom political activity was but the natural outgrowth

of an intense inner life of devotion. The comprehensive vision of Islam that he both articulated and

exemplified is, indeed, his most significant legacy.

Muhammad al-Baqir, ed. Sayyid Ahmad Fihri, Tehran, 1362 Sh./1983 (Arabic).

time, unpublished (Arabic)

address, unpublished (Arabic)

commentary on some of the hadith of Imam Riza, Tehran, 1417/1996 (Arabic)

Khomeini's views on gnostics, ethics, and theology, forthcoming (Persian)

Twelve Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt, with introduction and commentary by Sayyid Jalal al-Din

Ashtiyani, Tehran, 1372 Sh./1993 (Arabic)

Fusus and Muhammad Fanari's commentary on Sadr al-Din Qunawi's Miftah al-Ghayb, Qum, 1365

Sh./1986 (Arabic)

content, Tehran, 1372 Sh./1993 (Persian)

the prayer, with a preface by Ayatullah Javadi-Amuli, Tehran, 1369 Sh./1980 (Persian)

(Persian)

hereafter is to be understood, published as a supplement to the longer work of Hajj Mirza Javadi

Maliki-Tabrizi on the same subject and with the same title, Tehran, 1360 Sh./1981, pp. 253-60

(Persian)

Tehran, 1362 Sh./1983 (Arabic)

(Persian)

1981, pp. 365-425;

Tehran, 1373 Sh./1995 (Persian)

Jalal al-Din Rumi and Hafiz, Tehran, 1372 Sh./1993 (Persian)

Tehran, n.d. (Persian)

Sh./ 1994. (Persian)

Kazim Khurasani on usul al-fiqh, 2 vols., Tehran, 1372 Sh./1993 (Arabic)

Fi 'l-Taqiya, with notes by Mujtaba Tihrani, Qum 1385/1965 (Arabic)

1414/1993 (Arabic)

by Ayatullah Fazil Lankurani, 2 vols., Tehran, 1372 Sh./1993 (Arabic)

moonlit nights, Qum, 1368 Sh./1990 (Arabic)

Kazim Yazdi (d. 1919), a comprehensive treatise on all the categories of fiqh, Qum, 1340 Sh./ 1961

al-Makasib al-Muharrama, on forbidden modes of earning, 2 vols., Qum, 1381/1961 (Arabic)

Hasan Isfahani (d. 1946), Qum, n.d. (Arabic)

pertaining to inheritance, Qum, n.d. (Persian)

edition is that prepared by Ayatullah Rizvani, Tehran, 1408/1987 (Persian)

(Arabic)

(Arabic)

ritual purity, Qum 1403/1983 (Arabic)

revolution, Qum, Vol. I, 1366 Sh./1987, Vol. II, 1372 Sh./1993 (mostly Persian, some Arabic)

Beirut, 1413/1992 (Arabic)

Vilayat-i Faqih ya Hukumat-i Islami, text of the lectures delivered by Imam Khomeini in Najaf in

1348 Sh./1969. Numerous printings.

al-Hukumat al-Islamiya, Najaf, 1389/1969; "Islamic Government," in Islam and Revolution,

translated by Hamid Algar, Berkeley, 1981, pp. 27-166.

1360 Sh./1981 (Persian)

Bunyanguzar-i Jumhuri-yi Islami-yi Iran Hazrat-i Ayatullah al-'Uzma Imam Khumayni, Tehran, 1368

Sh./1989.

Nass al-Wasiyat al-Ilahiyat al-Siyasiya li 'l-Imam al-Qa'id Ruhullah al-Musawi al-Khumayni, Tehran,

1989; Imam Khomeini's Last Will and Testament, Washington D.C., 1989

* * *

Iran, VII, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 751-5, 759-64; Idem, "The Fusion of Gnosticism and Politics in the

Personality and Life of Imam Khomeini," forthcoming

1375 Sh./1996 (a biography of Hajj Sayyid Ahmad Khomeini, the second son of the Imam)

"Ruhullah Musavi Khumayni: Ta'allum dar Hauza-yi 'Ilmiyya-yi Qum," Chashm-andaz, 11 (winter,

Mu'allim va Murad-i Ruhullah Musavi Khumayni," Chashm-andaz, 13 (Spring 1373 Sh./1994), pp.

32-41.

the Classical Tradition," Middle Eastern Studies, 18 (1982), pp. 3-20

Tehran, 1370 Sh./1991

II, Tehran, 1364 Sh./1985

International Politics, Lanham, Maryland, 1983

Perbincangan, Yogyakarta, 1984

1416/1995

Mustafa Khomeini, the Imam's eldest son)

(reminscences of various personalities concerning the Imam).

English-born Hamid Algar received his Ph.D. In oriental studies from Cambridge. Since 1965 he has

served on the faculty of the Department of Near Eastern Studies at the University of California,

Berkeley, where he teaches Persian and Islamic history and philosophy. Dr Algar has written

extensively on the subject of Iran and Islam, including the books Religion and State in Iran, 1785-

1906 and Mirza Malkum Khan: A Biographical Study in Iranian Modernism. He has been following

the Islamic movement in Iran with interest for many years. In an article published in 1972, he

assessed the situation there and forecast the Revolution "more accurately than all the U.S.

government's political officers and intelligence analysts," in the words of Nicholas Wade, Science

magazine. Dr. Algar has translated numerous books from Arabic, Turkish, and Persian, including the